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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\V ALTER CORBET
'
Plaintiff' and Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

11910

ARTA 0. CORBET,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NAT URE OF THE CASE
This is an action for dissolution of a partnership
and for a partnership accounting.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The court below, after a four-day trial and consideration of the evidence and briefs of counsel for the
respective parties, made and entered Findings of
Condusions of La"v and Judgment resolving the dis·
1

puted issues in favor of plaintiff and ordering dissolution of the partnership and distribution of the assets
to the parties as their respective interests were found
to be and in accordance with law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Both parties admit that the court's judgment
soundly dissolves the partnership, but appellant claims
the trial court erred in relation to its Findings and
Judgment "as to the terms of the partnership agreement" and seeks a reversal of the Judgment on that
ground. It is respondent's position that the Findings
of the trial court and Judgment entered thereon are
amply supported by the evidence and that they should
be sustained and the relief sought by appellant denied.

SUPPLEl\!IENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts refers only to the
pleadings of the parties without referring at all to the
transcript of the evidence given by the witnesses at
the trial and to only three of the exhibits admitted in
evidence. It is therefore necessary to make a supplemental statement of facts directing the court's attention
to the evidence upon which the Findings and Judgment
of the trial court are based.
At the outset we call attention to the rather broad
areas of agreement which give rise to certain undisputed
2

facts. Respondent was born in Kansas where he grew
up and operated as a farmer. After twenty-six years
of married life, his wife died, and therafter he mo,·ed
to Burns, Oregon, where he engaged in business as a
rancher, a butcher, and other business ventures. He
had an unsuccessful marriage in Oregon which lasted
about one year, after which plaintiff came to Utah in
1949 and established a trailer court and sales lot at
Orem. This he sold in 1954 and there acquired a trailer
sales business which he was operating in September of
1954. (Tr. 64-67). At that time, respondent met the
appellant, Arta Ottosen, of Sterling, Utah, who responded to a newspaper ad and was employed by plaintiff in the trailer sales business. Appellant had no
prior trailer sales experience but she learned readily
and was a good salesman. Respondent and appellant
were married three months later, on December 28, 1954,
at Las Vegas, Nevada, and thereafter at Orem, Utah,
operated the Corbet Trailer Sales business together.
(Tr. u7-72). Appellant and her children owned land
in Sterling, Utah, derived from the estate of her deceased husband. The parties spent part of the time
together on this property while they were operating
the Corbet Trailer Sales in Orem. In 1957, the parties
brought into the Corbet Trailer Sales business, .Merrill
.Jacobson and his wife, Bette Ottosen Jacobson, a
<laughter of appellant. Neither :Merrill nor Bette had
had any previous trailer sales business experience, but
they learned the business and ultimately purchased
Orem Trailer Sales from respondent and appellant.

3

(Tr. 75-76). The marriage of respondent and appellant
began to deteriorate in about 1956, and gradually
worsened until respondent filed suit for a divorce in
1961. The court file in that case was received in evidence at the trial as Exhibit 26, it being Civil No. 5085
in the District Court of Sanpete County. The case was
pending in that court until September 14, 1962, when
a Settlement Agreement signed long prior thereto was
approved by the court and Findings and Decree were
entered, divorcing the parties. The value of the property acquired by the parties during that marriage was
$65,471.54, as shown by the Stipulation, and the Decree
gave to each of them $32,735.70, and became final on
December 15, 1962. (Tr. 85-97). On petition of the
parties the District Court of Sanpete County entered
an order setting the divorce Decree aside, but same was
subsequently nullified in a divorce proceeding brought
by appellant on a motion of respondent because the
action was not taken before the Decree became final.
Nevertheless the parties went back together in early
March, 1963 and ever since then they have both treated
their relationship as husband and wife and the subject
property of this suit was contributed and accumulated
since their reconciliation. (Tr. 98-101).
Both respondent and appellant agree that a part·
ership relationship existed between them, and that
because the other violated the partnership agreement
that the relationship should be terminated. (R. 5, 15).
Another area of agreement concerns the contri4

butions of respondent and appellant in the partnership
renture at St. George. The appellant admits that respondent put the cash and property shown on Exhibit
:n into that operation, and respondent admits that the
appellant contributed the value shown on Exhibit 3.
Also there is no dispute but that $1351.64 came from
lhe joint bank account on the parties in the Manti City
llank and was put in the St. George venture. The undisputed evidence, Exhibit 6, also shows that cash iu
the sum of $2,077.35 was taken by the parties from the
St. George operation and invested in improvements
of the Peacock home at Sterling; and that the purchase
price of the said Peacock home in the sum of $5700.00
was paid by appellant from the $36,000.00 she derived
from the sale of the Neeley property (Sterling Ranch)
but whether or not these funds constitute an asset of
the partnership is disputed. Both parties admit that
the Parowan investment in the sum of $2900.32, plus,
was made from the partnership funds derived from the
St. George operation.
The crucial issues in this case are stated in the trial
court's decision (R. 41-42) as follows : " ( 1) What
capital contributions were made by the parties and the
date of commencement of the venture, and ( 2) Did
the parties agree that defendant receive a monthly wage
of :\)300.00 ?'' The court found these issues in favor of
respondent and appellant attacks these Findings on
this appeal.
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POINT I
RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO POINTS
OF APPELLANT.
POINT I. It is agreed that an action for partnership accounting is equitable in nature. In fact Section
48-1-18 Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides that a
partner is accountable as a fiduciary and is a Trustee
of partnership property in connection with the forma·
tion, conduct or liquidation of the partnership. It follows
that a review on appeal where, as here, it is claimed
that the evidence admitted at the trial does not support
the findings and judgment of the court, the facts as
well as the law may be reviewed on appeal. The scope
of the review by the Supreme Court is stated in Randall
v. Tracy Collins 1'rust Company, 6 Utah 2d 18, 23
( 1956) , as follows:
"In an eq uity review of facts if the record shows
a fair preponderance, or even if the evidence is
balanced evenly, the trial court findings should be
sustained. If the evidence is so vague and un·
certain that the finding is obviously erroneous,
there may be a new finding on review."
Respondent's position is that a review of the evidence
offered and received by respondent is clear and convinc·
ing and amply supports the trial court's findings.
POINT II: The evidence supports the finding by
the court that the partnership agreement was not re·
duced to writing as claimed by appellant. Counsel's brief
refers to appellant's testimony and that of the witnesses
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Luml and Covington to support the allegation that
there was such a written agreement which gave appellant $300.00 a month for services rendered to the partuership. In appellant's agreement the discrepancy
between .Exhibits 1 and 29 is cursorily brushed aside.
Also the expert testimony is dismissed as speculation
perhaps on the testimony of appellant's expert only.
Counsel for appellant is significantly silent about the
fart that the trial court, who heard and weighed the
evidence, found against his contention. Hereinafter in
sub<liYison A of Point II respondent refers to the
record indicating the evidence supporting the court's
finding that there was no such written partnership agreement entitling appellant to $300.00 per month for her
services to the partnership.
ln view of the fact that appellant failed to bring
this claimed agreement to the attention of respondent
until she filed an amended complaint in her 1968 divorce
action, we are prompted to call the court's attention
to Section 48-1-15 (6) Utah Code Annotated 1953,
which provides:
" . . . ( 6) No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business, except
that a su1Tidng partner is entitled to reasonable
compensation for his services in winding up the
partnership affairs."

The case of Charnucrs v. Sirnrns, 13 Utah
P 2d 841 ( 1962) stated the law as follows:
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371, 374

"Gene.rally, a partner is not entitled to any remuneration for his services in the absence of an
agreement by the partners to that effect ... "
POINT III: Contrary to appellant's contention the
court's findings as to the assets of the partnership is
supported by the evidence. Again counsel points to
appellant's testimony to support her claim that the
court erred in finding the Manti City Hank account
and the Ster ling Ranch as assets of the firm. Again we
point to the fact that the court heard and weighed all
the evidence at the trial and found these to be partnership assets and we point to the evidence in subsection
ll of Point II which shows the evidence which sustains
the court findings.
We are unable to understand counsel's contention
that the mortgage interest of respondent was not among
his contributions to the partnership. The fact that he
released the mortgage is no evidence that the proceeds
of same had not been contributed by him to the partnership. The Mortgage and Note were in his name when
the parties went back together and he alone could
release the same, which he did. The court's attention is
called to Exhibit 9 showing respondent's deposits in
the l\'1anti joint bank account of the partnership begin·
ning April 1, 1963 and continuing until that account
was closed out in August of 1964. ':Ve call attention to
a deposit dated 7/15/63 in the amount of $1509.88 and
another dated 1/20/64 in the sum of $1500.00, botb
of which were payments made by respondent's son on
the mortgage in question. 'Ve also point to Exhibit 5
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which shows contributions made to the partnership
account by respondent after the account was moved
from
to the Hank of St. George showing a
total of *14,742.()() in cash contributions and listing
deposit 11117/64, a $1500.00 deposit on
a
I/4'1 o5, a $1500.00 deposit dated :.>./11/66 and a $1500.00
deposit dated 1/3/67, all of which were proceeds of the
respondent's Oregon mortgage. Counsel for appellant
may have the mistaken notion that respondent is also
claiming the face value of the mortgage as a capital
contribution to the partnership. The court should refer
to plaintiff's
3 which shows that respondent
does not make such a claim. The mortgage in question
was fully liquidated and paid prior to the time it was
released by respondent and counsel cannot point to
auy evidence to the contrary, and while the partnership continued, respondent contributed all the proceeds
from the mortgage to the joint accounts of the parties.
POINT I Y: Appellant's Point IV pertaining to the
Statute of Frauds is without merit in that the same is
raised for the first time in this court. Appellant's pleadings did not raise the defense of the Statute of Frauds
which according to Rule 8 ( c) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, is an affirmative defense required to be
specifically pleaded in the answer. Rule 12 (h) provides:

"A party waives all defenses and
which he does not present either by mot10n as
hereinafter provided or, if he
made no motion, in his ans\ver or reply, ...
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It is to be further noted that at no place in the

record is there a reference to the Statute of Frauds
or any claim thait it was a defense to plaintiff's claims
in this proceeding. Clearly, defendant has waived any
right to reply on the Statute of Frauds and cannot
now raise that issue for the first time. It would seem
a fair assumption that trial counsel considered the
Statute of Frauds as a defense but concluded that the
Doctrine of Part Performance would clearly remove
the statute from application to the oral partnership
agreement. See Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Company, Supra, pp 23, 24 which summarizes the concept
of part performance in removing the operation of the
Statute of Frauds.
POINT V: The record title presumption is rebutted
by the evidence. Appellant's counsel argues for a pre·
sumpton arising from the record title to the ranch
property but he fails to indicate here who held the
record title. Neither does he cite the record to show
that appellant was the record owner of the Sterling
Ranch. A California and an Idaho case are cited for a
rule of law with which we have no quarrel but both
are irrelevant inasmuch as no evidence is cited under
this point to which they might apply. In one of the
cases In re Capolino, 210 P 2d 850 at 852, there is a
relevant statement of law which counsel did not cite
which is as follows:
"Obviously appellant's arguments are not such
as are proper to be considered by an appellate
court. Only when it can be said that the findings
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of fact of a trial court are without substantial
support in the record has such appellate court
power to reverse a judgment which is supported
by_ the evidence in the case. The weight of the
to be drawn from it, and
evidence, the
the credibility of the witnesses, are matters exclusively for determination by the trial court;
all intendments are in favor of the judgment,
and in order to justify a reversal thereof an appellant must show to an appellate court that the
evidence most favorable to the respondent fails
to furnish substantial support for the findings."
The record in this case shows that the record title to
the Sterling Ranch property was in the names of appellant's children from :May 15, 1962 until August 20,
HW5. (Def. Ex. 30), but that appellant claimed it as
her own and so represented it to respondent upon whose
insistence partnership funds in the sum of $5000.00
were paid to the children. (Ex. 18, Tr. 109-113).
Furthermore, the trial court heard appellant's evidence
and weighed and considered same along with respondent's evidence on this point and made a finding that the
Sterling Ranch was an asset of the partnership and
the finding is amply supported by the evidence.
POINT VI: The judgment entered requires no
further litigation to implement same. It is sustained
by the findings and it dissolves the partnership as of
.T uly 1, 1969. The judgment adjudicates the respective
contributions to the partnership of respondent and
appellant, and also the current assets are ascertained
and established. It adjudges the respective distributive
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share_s of the appellant and respondent. The judgment
also distributes all profits realized by the operation
of the partnership since July 1, 1969 in equal shares
to the same parties. 'i\T e fail to see any vagueness in
the judgment and it will require but little bookkeeping
to make the complete distribution pursuant to the judg.
ment.
Appellant argues under this point two reasons why
the judgment is vague ( 1) the St. George Trailer
Sales business is not divided by the judgment and (2)
the Peacock house has not been divided thereby. This
argument fails to take into consideration paragraph 3
of the judgment which contains the following provision:
"That the current assets and profits of the partnership be, and the same are hereby adjudged
to be as follows:
St. George business and lot subject to $5000 option and expense
of law suit on same ------------------------

$32,000.00

Sterling home (Peacock) property and furniture including water
shares. ______ _______________ ___ ___ ________ _____ ____ __ 11,000.00"
The judgment simply means that the values of both
properties have been adjudicated and each party takes
a one-half interest in the value as fixed in the judgment
regardless of the outcome of the law suit on the St.
George property. The judgment in dissolving
part·
nership permits respondent to continue operatmg as
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a sole proprietor the trailer sales business in St. George
upon paying to the defendant the balance due her in
the accounting of $1,862.29 plus one-half of the profits
after July 1, 1969. Respondent is now operating as a
sale proprietor and is ready, willing and able to remit
to appellant the balance due her.

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERANTLY
SLTPPORTS TRIAL COURT'S :FINDINGS AND
JUDGMENT AS SHO,VN BY THE RECORD
AS FOLLOWS:

A. The Partnership existed from and after early
1963.

\Vhile at Phoenix early in 1963 respondent was
advised over long distance telephone by appellant's
daughter that reconciliation with appellant was now
favorable. Thereafter respondent and appellant arranged a meeting in Phoenix, Arizona, early in March
of 1963, and there had conversations concerning recondliation. These conversations lead to a reconciliation
agreement between the parties. (Tr. 98-107). Appellant denies this and contends that the reconciliation
agreement was contained in letters she received from
the respondent, but the correspondence appellant produced at the trial failed to sustain this contention.
(Ex. a2-Tr. 497-505). The evidence accepted by the
trial court was that out of these Phoenix conversations
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there resulted an agreement between the parties that
they woudl go back together and be reconciled, and
that they ·would put the separate property of each of
them in their joint names and share equally in whatever
profits were made out of their investments. (Tr. 101107). This evidence further showed that appellant
agreed not to spend so much time with her children
at the Trailer Sales Lot in Orem and that the parties
would return to the ranch at Sterling where they would
begin their operations. (Tr. 102).
The parties then began their return trip to Utah
and on the way they stopped at Kanab, Utah, and looked
at a possible investment in a trailer part there, deciding
against it, (Tr. I 03) and then returned to the Sterling
Ranch in Sanpete County and they there settled down
to operating their business affairs together. (Tr. 105·
106). Respondent then joined with appellant in the
abortive attempt to set aside the Divorce Decree, this
being appellant's second thought after first proposing
that they be remarried in Nevada, appellant claiming
that to set aside the Decree would be better because
it would not interfere with the respondent's Veterans
Administration Disability Compensation and Social
Security payments due him if the old marriage was
revived. (Ex. 26-Tr. 105-106). The petition to set
aside the Decree of Divorce was filed on l\'Iarch 26,
1963, a short time after they returned from Arizona
(Ex. 26-Civil No. 5085) .
After the parties returned to Sterling, Utah to
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live at the Ster ling Ranch the first thing they did was
to establish a joint bank account in the .Manti City
Hank on or about April 1, 1963, which bank account
was active until on or about August 4, 1964. (Tr. 113114) . During this time appellant made deposits and
withdrawals in said bank account for and on behalf
of both parties. (Tr. 114-116). During the period that
this bank account was active $8185.48 of respondent's
funds were deposited therein, and during the same
period $4001.07 of appellant's money, exclusive of
those checked in and out immediately for her family,
were deposited in the same bank account. (Ex. 3, Tr.
114-118, 460).

The trial court further accepted respondent's testimony which showed that appellant represented to him
that the Sterling Ranch (Neeley) had been put in the
joint names of the parties and that it was not necessary
to pay her children anything for the land on which
the home stood at the ranch. However, respondent insisted that the children be paid $5000.00 for this land
an<l appellant agreed and this was done as shown by
Exhibit 18 which is a copy of the check dated July
12, 1963, drawn by appellant on Corbet Trailer Sales
at Orem in the amount of $5000.00 payable to "\Valter
and Arta Corbet" which was deposited in the Manti
joiut bank account and the same day checks were made
from that account to appellant's children for their
portion of the proceeds. (Ex. 18, Tr. 102, 107, 109, J67468). This $5000.00 given to appellant's children for
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the land as passed by appellant's first husband is credited to appellant as one of her contributions to the
partnership account as shown in Exhibit No. 3.
It should be noted that the Sterling Ranch property was unimproved land at the time it descended to
appellant and her children from 1\-lr. Ottosen, appellant's first husband. It was not until after the marriage
of appellant and respondent that the land was improved
by building a home thereon. (Tr. 80-83). Further in
the first divorce proceeding the accumulations of the
parties was agreed between them to total $65,471.54
which the parties agreed to split 50150. Paragraph 3
the Settlement Agreement in Exhibit 26 provides for
the method of giving plaintiff (respondent herein) his
one-half interest in the property of the parties, and
paragraph 4 of the Settlement Agreemeut provides for
giving defendant (appellant herein) her one-half interest
in the property and contains the following subparagraph:
"(b) The defendant shall have awarded to her
the value of the home, the land and the cattle at
Sterling, Sanpete County, Utah, in the sum of
$20,183.00, the same to be charged against her
one-half interest in the subject property aforesaid."
This clearly shows that the home on the Sterling Ranch
was considered a joint accumulation of the parties at
the time of the first marriage. Also plaintiff's Exhibit
2 shows that the parties put an $11,183.31 value on the
investment made in the Sterling Ranch home. (Ex. 26.
Ex. 2).
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It is also shown by respondent's evidence that after
the reconciliation in March of 1963 the parties built
an addition on to the Sterling Ranch home which cost
$5,581.07 and was paid for by drawing the funds out
of the .Manti City Bank joint account as shown upon
Exhibit J., the items making up these expenditures
dated from July 5, 1963, to May 21, 1964, and it was
appellant who drew these checks upon the joint bank
account. (Ex. 3, 4, Tr. 115, 118, 128.).
lt is further shown by respondent's evidence that
the joint bank account at Manti was used in connection
with the same of cattle from the Sterling Ranch, the
same as the cattle that had been considered joint property in the divorce settlement. (Ex. 26, Ex. 2, Tr. 8590, 109).

Although appellant stated that these joint operations with respondent were pursuant to an agreement
that the parties keep all monies deposited by them in
the :Manti joint account separate, and that respondent
had made his deposits of the money in the joint account
for the purpose of taking it out to start a trailer sales
agency later on, she could not produce any accounting
showing the separate handling of funds deposited by
either of them or paid out of the joint account. (Tr.
460-475) .

Also the evidence shows that during the period
between .March 10, 1964, and April 15, 1964, the parties
expended from their joint :Manti City Bank account
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for the opening of the St. George Corbet Trailer Sales
Lot No. 2, the total sum of $1351.64 as shown by
itemization on Exhibit 8. (Tr. 114).
B. The capital contributions awl current assets are as
found by the court.
The testimony of respondents as to contributions
is summarized in Exhibit 3 (Tr. 124) . Appellant's testimony in this regard is summarized on Exhibit 21. Ex·
hibit 3 contemplates that the partnership began in
:March, 1953, when the parties were reconciled and
began living together. Appellant is credited for the
value of the Sterling Ranch at the same price as it was
given to her in the divorce settlement, $11,200.00, (Ex.
2), the value of the cattle on the ranch and the $5000.00
paid to appellant's children for the ground on which the
ranch home stood, and also her deposits in the joint
bank account at Manti, the total value of such contributions is $23,684.38. Also appellant is given credit
for her contributions to the St. George Lot No. 2,
including her Government checks and advances from
the Orem Corbet Trailer Sales in the sum of $5,218.02,
making her total contribution in the sum of $28,902.40.
(Tr. 107-124). Respondent's Exhibit 3 and his testi·
mony also shows his contributions to the
from
of 1963 to the time of trial to be the total
amount of $34,128.14. (Ex. 3 Tr. 107-124).
Appellant's Exhibit 21 summarizes her testimony
coneerning her contributons to the partnership but she
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covers only the operations of the Corbet Trailer Sales
Lot No. 2 at St. George and she omits the Sterling
Ranch property entirely. (Ex. 21) . The trial court
weighed the evidence of both parties in this connection
and found for respondent. ( R. 45) . Appellant includes
in Exhibit 21, $14,400.00, the amoun tof accumulated
salary under the alleged agreement, Exhibit 1, to which
the court found she was not entitled, the agreement
being non-existent. (R. 41, 45, 53).
Hespon<lent testified that the current assets of the
partnership are as shown on Exhibit 19. His evidence
in this regard begins when the partnership agreement
was made and operations began during the month of
March, 1963, and continuing thereafter. It contemplatrs that the Sterling Ranch became an asset of the
partnership, but that the $36,000.00 for which it was
subsequently sold by appellant never reached the partnership account, but was withheld and claimed as separate property by appellant. And these proceeds, plus
interest on the balance payable under the sales contract,
amounting to $36,300.00, remains in the hands of the
appellant and she is charged with the profits realized
on the Sterling Ranch transaction. (Tr. 247-262). The
court found that the Sterling Ranch became an asset
of the partnership and the preponderance of the evidence sustains the findings. ( R. 45, Tr. 248-249).
The St. George Trailer Lot was valued by respondent's evidence at $32,000.00, subject to the pending law suit and expense of same. Also Exhibit 19
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shows the Peacock home, including the furniture and
the water stock thereon is valued at $11,000.00. The
Exhibit shows that appellant owes the partnership
$650.00 about which there is no dispute. The evidenct
supporting this exhibit shows these current joint assets
to be of the value of $82,850.32; that appellant's invest·
ment in the real estate and the business amounts to
$28,902.40; respondent's investment in the real estate
and the business amounts to $34,128.U. Deducting tht
capital contributions from the value of the current
assets leaves a total net profit to the partnership of
$19,819.78. One-half of which net profits is given to
each of the parties in the sum of $9,909.89, the total
entitlement of appellant's share being $38,812.29. The
exhibit shows the deduction from aJppellant's share
the sum of $36,950.00 which is the Sterling Raneh sale
proceeds, plus interest for three years and ten months
at five (5%) percent, which appellant has already had,
leaving a balance of $1862.29 due her at the time of the
entry of the Findings and Judgment. Respondent's
share is shown on the exhibit to be $44,038.03 as of
the same date. The court found that Exhibit 19 reflects
the current assets and the evidence amply sustains the
findings. (R. 41, 45, 53).
C. There was no written partnership agreement entit·
ling appellant to $300.00 per month for services.
The second crucial issue of fact at the trial per·
tained to appellant's claimed written agreement where·
by she was to receive a wage of $:300.00 per month for
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her services in the partnership. The document offered
in support of this contention was Exhibit 1. The evidence showed that although appellant's claimed agreement is dated April 10, 1965, she did not disclose it or
make any claim for partnership wages until she filed
an amendment to her divorce complaint ' Exhibit 28 ,
Civil No. 5727, in November of 1968. (Tr. 580-581,
Ex.
p. 3 Amed. Comp.) .
Appellant failed to adduce any evidence that any
record was ever kept of the claimed $300.00 per month
wages at any place in the books and records of the
partnership operations. Reasonable inferences may be
drawn from the record that the claimed agreement was
not made known to anyone until it became apparent that
there was no marriage between the parties before or
after the divorce became final and that the property
affairs of the parties would have to be settled on the
basis of a partnership. (Tr. 313-314, Ex. 28 Comp.
and Arndt.) . Respondent denies that there was any
such agreement and that the first he knew about it
was at a conference between the parties in the office
of his attorneys a short time before the amended complaint was filed by appellant. (Tr. 169-172, 581).
Appellant's testimony concerning this claimed
agreement is that she made notes in her own handwriting setting forth its provisions, Exhibit 1, that it
wa" dated April 10, 1965, and typed by the witness
Lanny Lund, who made an original and copies of same,
with slight changes, and that this original document
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was signed by the respondent and appellant before a
witness, Covington, a Notary Public of St. George
that the original executed document was placed [11
respondent's metal box along with other papers belong.
ing to appellant, and that respondent has the original
in his possession. (Tr. 37-42, 54-58, 437-438). Respondent denies possession of auy such document and
testifies that he never discussed any such agreement witn
appellant, that he never saw it, and that it was never
in the metal box, and no such agreement exists. (Tr.
1()9-171, 581).

The appellant failed to produce a signed or unsigned copy of the agreement even though both she and
the witness, Lund, testified that copies were made.
Neither the witness, Lund, nor the witness, Covington.
could testify as to the terms contained in the alleged
agreement. Appellant has failed to produce a single
witness, beside herself, who saw the claimed original
agreement knowing what it was; and both Covington
and Lund admitted on cross examination that appellant
told them what the alleged document was prior to the
trial. (Tr. 58-63, 38-41). Thus Exhibit I is an unsigned
document written in the handwriting of the appellant
which contains self-serving statements designed to
support her claim of there being an agreement between
these partners that she was to receive $300.00 per mouth
as wages for services rendered iu the business.
Comparison of Exhibit 1 with Exhibit 29 indicates
that the latter is a l'opy of Exhibit I reproduced upon
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the taking of respondent's deposition .May 14, 1969.
\Ve are unable to find any trace of the tear in this
photo copy (Ex. 29) that exists following the first two
figures ( 19) at the top of the original Exhibit 1 and
which appear on all subsequent photo copies of Exhibit 1 and which appear on all subsequent photo copies
of Exhibit 1. The comparison indicates that the date
line of Exhibit 1 was torn subsequent to the photogrnphing of the document on May 14, 1969 when Exhibit 29 was created. Appellant testified on cross examination that Exhibit 1 was in the same condition, with
the tear on it, as it was found by her at the St. George
place of business. (Tr. 440-442). This testimony poses
a serious question concerning the authenticity of the
document and appellant's credibility concerning same.
Was the document altered at the date line, if so, why
and by whom, and for what purpose? (Exs. 36, 37, 38).
The trial court found that no written agreement for
wages existed. It seems that very little if any credence
could be given Exhibit 1.
Lillian C. Covington, a Notary Public of St. George,
testified that respondent and appellant appeared before
her and acknowledged their signatures to the Exhibit
1. The positive testimony of this witness states that she
had notarized the respondent's signature only twice,
once in April or May, 1965, when the alleged agreement was acknowledged before her, and once when
she drew a document for respondent and notarized it
"a month and a half or two later on". (Tr. 54-60).
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The document which is the release of mortgagt
to which she testified was admitted in evidence as Ex.
hibit 41 and Same is the one the witness stated SOt
wondered why the plaintiff signed the same
view of the Utah Law requiring a wife's signature
(Tr. 55-57). This docwnent was notarized on Sep
tember 25, 1965. The witness also testified that sht
notarized this release in April or lVIay of 1965. (Tr.
55, 56-57). The second document the witness notarizea
for the plaintiff would have to be the release of morl·
gage signed by both appellant and respondent dated
and acknowledged January 15, 1967, and recordea
January 16, 1967 in the off ice of the 'V ashington
County Recorder at St. George. (Exhibit 42). 'fhest
two exhibits clearly rebut the Covington testimoni
She states she could remember clearly the notarizing
of what would be the alleged written agreement il
April or l\fay, 1965, and also she says that the secona
and last document was notarized a few months later
This was incorrect since Exhibit 42 shows it was no·
tarized by the witness in January of 1967 (Ex .42).
This witness's testimony has probably been recon·
structed through conversations with the appellant ano
is obviously incorrect and not believable. Either horn
of her
destroys her credibility. She says she
notarized respondent's signature hut twice, and plain·
tiff has submitted two documents notarized by her from
the public records of Utah and Oregon, and neither is
the alleged written agreement. According to her ow11
testimony Covington did not witness the alleged agree·
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ment, .Exhibit 1, since the record contains copies of the
only hvo documents where the witness notarized the
respondent's signature. ( Exs. 41 and 42).
Exhibit 1 shows on its face at the top that the date of
the document following the figures "19" has been torn
out. An expert witness, Ben Garcia, examined the document and his report is in evidence as Exhibit 38, together
with a blown-up picture of the tear as Exhibit 37. The
tear in Exhibit 1 is not shown on Exhibit 29, the photo
copy of Exhibit 1 which first appeared at the time the
deposition of respondent was taken. The opinion of
Garcia is that the original date of Exhibit 1 was 1967,
and his opinion gives compelling reasons for the conclusion he draws, taken chiefly from the residual marks
of the original date appearing immediately below the
tear line. 'The opinion of appellant's expert, Robert
F. Carver, is in evidence as Exhibit 40 and although
he states "that it is not possible to say what number
follows the number 6 on the missing paper" nevertheless Garcia finds residual evidence that sustains his
eonclusion. The witness Garcia's opinion that the missing
date on Exhibit 1 was 1967 is corroborated by the fact
that the serious breach of the relationship of the parties
occurred in the early Spring of 1967, sometime after
respondent discovered that appellant was withholding
the $36,000.00 proceeds of the sale of the Sterling
Ranch property assets. Respondent testified that Ellis
Ottosen and Leitha Ottosen, his wife, employees of
the partnership at the St. George operation, told respondent when he was about to leave after an altercation
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with appellant, that "They did not blam• nim". (Tr
294-295). 'Ve point to this fact to indicate at Exhibit
1 was probably dashed off at about this
ne or soon .
thereafter. This conclusion seems reasonable and prob. cii
1
able in the light of Garcia's opinion and the dilemma J
of the witness Covington' s story. Furthermore it also cc
seems_
for appellant to be thinking about
the d1v1s1on of assets, as she did when the abortive
attempt was made to set aside the divorce Decree earh w
.
' Sl
m 1963 and she told respondent it would be better from l
the standpoint of having no interruption occur to the :
receipt of plaintiff's Veterans Administration Disabilit)· SJ,
Compensation and Social Security benefits. (Tr. 105). C

Finally Exhibit 1 was in the possession of the appel· ii
lant from the time she claimed she made it and she kept a
it secret until she filed her amendment to the divorce
complaint in 1968, a period of upwards of four years.
(Tr. 169-172) . .From this evidence the court found that
the partnership began in 1\-Iarch of 1963 when the parties
agreed to pool their assets and proceed in business
transactions, splitting the profits, and that the proceeds
of the sale of Sterling Ranch in the sum of $36,000.0J
should be included as a partnership asset acquired in
the course of a partnership venture; as was also the
Peacock home and the trailer sales lot in St. George
and the Parowan properties, all of same being acqui·
sitions of the partnership and should be split between
the parties after credit is given for capital contributions
as heretofore outlined and as set forth in respondenh
Exhibit 3. (R. 45, 53).
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CONCLUSION

'

We tHf. "ve that appellant's attack on the sufficiency of tl evidence to sustain the :Findings and
Judgment ot1' the trial court has failed. Appellant's
counsel has argued on this appeal the evidence submitted at the trial most favorable to appellant as though
this tribunal were the trial court. The issue here is
whether or not the findings made by the trial court are
sufficient to sustain the judgment and the law is "If
the record shows a fair preponderance, or even if the
t'Vidence is balanced evenly, the trial court's findings
sD.ould be sustained." Randall v. 1 1racy Collins Trust
Curnpanys, Supra. We submit that the evidence
in this case preponderantly sustains the court's Findings
and Judgment and this court should affirm same.
Respectfully submitted,
BALLI!'-. & BALLIF
GEORGE S. BALLIF
GEORGE E. BALLIF
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
84 East 100 South, Provo, Utah 84601

the

rge
qui·

een

ons

27

